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The rationality of a belief often depends on whether it is rightly con-
nected to other beliefs, or more generally to other mental states —the
states capable of providing a reason to holding the belief in question.
For instance, some rational beliefs are connected to other beliefs by be-
ing inferred from them. It is often accepted that the connection implies
that the subject in some sense ‘takes the mental states in question to be
reason-providing’. But views on how exactly this is to be understood dif-
fer widely. They range from interpretations according to which ‘taking
a mental state to be reason-providing’ imposes a mere causal sustaining
relation between belief and reason-providing state to interpretations ac-
cording to which one ‘takes a mental state to be reason-providing’ only
if one believes that the state is reason-providing. The most common
worry about the latter view is that it faces a vicious regress. In this
paper a different but in some respects similar interpretation of ‘taking
something as reason-providing’ is given. It is argued to consist of a
disposition to react in certain ways to information that challenges the
reason-providing capacity of the allegedly reason-providing state. For
instance, that one has inferred A from B partly consists in being dis-
posed to suspend judgment about A if one obtains a reason to believe
that B does not render A probable. The account is defended against
regress-objections and the suspicion of explanatory circularity.
1 Inferential internalism: For and against
Inference and inferential justification is a good starting point for a dis-
cussion of the relation between a belief and the states which provide
the reason for holding the belief. For in the case of an inferred belief
it is more or less uncontroversial what state(s) provide(s) the reason
for which it is held. An inferred belief is held for a reason (or alleged
reason)1 provided by the belief(s) in the premise(s). Indeed, this will
here be taken as the defining feature of an inferentially held belief: A
belief is inferentially held, if and only if it is held for an (alleged) reason
such that the reason-providing (or allegedly reason-providing) states are
beliefs.
A very important divide between theories about inferential justifica-
tion concerns inferential internalism. This is the following controversial
principle (for a subject S, some premises P and a conclusion C):
inferential internalism: S justifiably infers C from P, only if S justi-
fiably believes that P supports2 C.
While something like this principle has been implicitly endorsed by the
epistemological tradition (arguably by Hume, Russell and Goodman),
it has become very controversial with the advent of epistemological ex-
ternalism. Externalistically inclined philosophers tend to reject it [e.g.
Van Cleve, 1984], while at least some of their internalist opponents en-
dorse it [e.g. Fumerton, 1995, Bonjour, 1998]. The divide between oppo-
nents and proponents of inferential internalism roughly coincides with
the divide between ‘internalists’ and ‘externalists’ understood as the
following contrasting general perspectives on justification: Externalists
stress the importance of the cooperation between the environment and
the belief-forming mechanisms and are critical towards all requirements
on the reasoners ability to assess her grounds. Internalists stress the
thinkers own capacity to view her belief in a positive light. For them,
there is a connection between the notion of epistemic justification and
1A belief can be held for a bad (alleged, inadequate) reason or for a good (real,
adequate, sufficient) reason. See below on page PAGE, for discussion and terminol-
ogy.
2For most of the paper it is irrelevant whether “supports” is understood as “makes
(objectively) probable” or something more explicitly normatively loaded such as “is
a reason for believing”. Wherever the distinction is relevant it will be explicitly taken
into account in the text.
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that of responsibility that requires a justified subject to have a justified
view on her grounds for believing.3
But it is of course possible to argue for or against inferential internal-
ism without first adopting one or the other general perspective. Indeed
some specific arguments have been put forward. The most prominent
sort of argument against inferential internalism develops a worry to the
effect that it leads to a vicious regress. Although proponents tend to ar-
gue from their general, “responsibilist” perspective, they also sometimes
appeal to intuitions about particular cases of justification by inference.
But neither of these two most prominent arguments is in itself very
powerful —this at least is what the next section aims to show.
1.1 The intuition in favor of inferential internalism
Here is a quote from Richard Fumerton [1995, 85-86] in which he argues
for the initial plausibility of inferential internalism:4
[I]t is prima facie plausible to suggest that one’s belief
in some proposition E can justify one in believing another
proposition P only when one’s belief that E is itself justified
and one has justification for thinking that E makes probable
P. [. . . O]ne can make the claim initially plausible simply by
looking at the ways in which it seems appropriate to chal-
lenge someone’s claim to have good (epistemic) reasons for
believing something. [. . . I]f I am talking to an astrologer
who infers from the present alignment of planets that there
will be prosperity this year, I am perfectly entitled to chal-
lenge the reasonability of the astrologer’s thinking that there
is a connection between the two states of affairs. If the as-
trologer shrugs her shoulders and admits it is just a whim-
sical hunch that Jupiter’s alignment with Mars might have
something to do with economic prosperity here on earth, I
3“internalism” and “externalism” is notoriously also used in other senses in epis-
temology. A closely related divide is that between proponents of “basic knowledge”
and its detractors, [cf. Cohen, 2002]. Also “dogmatists” and “conservatives” oppose
each other on related issues (in relation to Moore’s argument for knowledge of the
external world); [cf. Pryor, 2000, Wright, 2007].
4Appeals to similar cases are also present in Leite [2008], Cohen [2002], Wright
[2007]. I think the responses given here on behalf of opponents of inferential inter-
nalism could be used against these other appeals too.
can for that reason dismiss the astrologer’s claim to have
a justified belief about prosperity based on the position of
planets relative to one another.5
Everyone agrees that in the case described the astrologer is unjustified,
and that if he had a justified belief about the connection between the
positions of the planets and economic prosperity, then he would not
be unjustified. Even an austere reliabilist would agree. For, first, the
astrologer’s belief-formation is unreliable and would be disqualified by
the reliabilist for that reason. And, second, if the astrologer did rely
on a belief in the proposition that the positions of the planets indicate
economic prosperity (henceforth ‘P supports C’), then he would be using
a different belief-forming method (a different inference-pattern) that
presumably is reliable. So, let us grant Fumerton something more: The
fact that the astrologer shrugs his shoulders about P supports C but
nonetheless holds on to his belief in C ensures that in the described
case the astrologer is making an epistemic mistake. The mistake is not
contingent on whether or not the belief-formation is reliable. Even if his
belief-forming method were reliable (or had whatever other externalist
good-making feature one favors), the fact that he is neutral or indifferent
to the question whether P supports C while holding on to his belief in C
ensures that he is not behaving as the epistemic norms require. This is
an intuition about the case that many people are willing to share. The
problem for the proponent of inferential internalism is that even granted
that some epistemic norm or principle is violated by the astrologer, it
is not all clear that the principle is inferential internalism —rather than
some considerably weaker principle.
One way in which the principle violated by the astrologer may differ from
inferential internalism is with respect to the attitude that his shrugging
his shoulders expresses. It may be understood as expressing more than
a simple lack of belief in P supports C. According to inferential internal-
5Fumerton’s formulation of his case in favor of inferential internalism is slightly
misleading: That I can “dismiss the astrologer’s claim to have a justified belief”
does not imply that the astrologer does not have a justified belief that there will be
prosperity. That I can rightly dismiss his claim that he has a justified belief rather
indicates (or perhaps implies) that his belief that he has a justified belief is unjus-
tified. Unless we furthermore accept a principle which is even more controversial
than inferential internalism, namely that a belief in p can only be justified if one has a
justified belief that the belief in p is justified, it does not follow that the astrologer’s
belief that there will be prosperity this year is unjustified. So, let us rather say that
the shared intuition about the astrologer is that in the situation I can dismiss his
claim that there will be prosperity this year as unjustified.
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ism the subject inferring C from P is unjustified, unless she justifiably
believes that P supports C. But in the situation described the astrologer
does not merely not believe that P supports C. He actually consciously
suspends judgment about whether P supports C. An it is surely possible
not to believe p without consciously suspending judgment about the en-
tertained proposition p. Thus, the intuition could be taken to support
the following principle rather than inferential internalism:6
no-suspending-judgment S justifiably infers C from P, only if S is
not explicitly suspending judgment about whether P supports C.
This principle is compatible with the claim that a subject can justifiably
infer C from P, despite being “neutral” with respect to whether P sup-
ports C in the following sense: she need not have an attitude towards
the proposition that P supports C.
The principle actually supported by the case may be weaker in another
way too. According to inferential internalism the justified belief that P
supports C is a necessary condition on justifiably inferring C from P.
No matter what the epistemic situation of the subject —i.e. the avail-
able evidence, the beliefs already held, etc.— the justified belief that
P supports C must be there. Inferential justification is defeasible and
therefore that which is sufficient in some cases may not be sufficient
in others. The minimally required ingredients that in some cases are
sufficient for justification and in all cases are necessary are the ingre-
dients of prima facie justification. In those cases in which prima facie
justification is not sufficient it is defeated; that is, some aspect of the
subject’s epistemic situation cancels the justification. To be justified in
such cases, one requires further ingredients over and above the ingredi-
ents of prima facie justification, namely ingredients to compensate for
the cancellation of prima facie justification.
For the case at hand, one may argue that the astrologer does not find
himself in a situation in which prima facie justification is sufficient. In
particular the astrologer is confronted with an explicit challenge to pro-
vide a reason for believing that P supports C. And it may be argued
that such a challenge relevantly alters the subject’s epistemic situation
as compared with her situation before the challenge was raised. In par-
ticular, it may be argued that the challenge defeats any prima facie
justification that the subject might otherwise have. But then the in-
ferential internalist’s ingredient, the justified belief that P supports C,
6I take this point from Jim Pryor who made it during discussion of Leite [2008].
is not required for prima facie justification but only as an additional
ingredient to cancel the defeater.
Let us consider a case of which the inferential internalism’s opponent
would say that the subject has prima facie justification. For instance
take a case of an inductive generalization from P to C. Suppose that
at first all the conditions for inductive justification are fulfilled —and
suppose with the opponent of inferential internalism that it is not one
of these conditions to have a justified belief about the support-relation
between premises and conclusion. Suppose now that I acquire a reason
to believe that my observations were taken on an inductively defec-
tive sample —so that it is not true that if P, then probably C. Under
this circumstance my inductive generalization is defeated. Similarly, it
might be argued, if someone whom I believe to be rational and similarly
informed than I am, challenges one of my inferences by requesting a
reason for believing that P supports C, then my inference remains for
the time being defeated —until I can come up with such a reason or
until I can in another way dismiss the undermining evidence (e.g. by
justifiably believing that my interlocutor is unreasonable). Thus, the
intuition might be explainable by no more than the widely acceptable
following principle:
no-defeater: S justifiably infers C from P, only if the subject does not
possess an (undefeated) reason to disbelieve that P supports C.7
Still the described case elicits a relevant intuition which at least sup-
ports some principle about the subject’s view on the question whether
P supports C. Let us endorse this intuition and express it in the form
of the following vague principle:
anti-indifference: S justifiably infers C from P, only if S is not indif-
ferent to the question whether P supports C (but instead in some
sense ‘accepts’ that P supports C).
The principles no-defeater and no-suspending-judgment allow to say some-
thing more explicit about the sort of ‘acceptance’ minimally required by
anti-indifference: The sort of ‘acceptance’ is incompatible with explicitly
suspending judgment about whether P supports C. (It is also incom-
patible with disbelieving that P supports C. That can be shown be
7Bergmann [2005] appeals to such principles in order to generally explain away
intuitions in favor of higher-order requirements on justification.
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slightly modifying the case invoked by Fumerton.) And it is incompat-
ible with the subject’s having reasons to disbelieve that P supports C.
(It is arguably also incompatible with the subject’s having reasons to
explicitly suspend judgment about whether P supports C. It is plausible
that such a reason would act as a defeater too. This intuition can be
elicited by modifying the example involving an inductive generalization
from above.)
How to develop anti-indifference into a precise principle is the subject
of the main part of the paper. The important point here is that even
granting to the proponent of inferential internalism the relevant intu-
ition, there is no compulsion to accept inferential internalism rather
than something considerably weaker.
1.2 The regress-argument against inferential inter-
nalism
But similarly, the prominent regress argument8 against inferential inter-
nalism does not compel one to reject inferential internalism rather than
something considerably stronger.9
Boghossian closes his first (published) development of the regress-objection
against inferential internalism as follows:
[. . . ] at some point it must be possible to use a rule in
reasoning [from P to C] in order to arrive at a justified con-
clusion, without this use needing to be supported by some
knowledge about the rule that one is relying on [or about
the support-relation from P to C —see below in the text]. It
must be possible simply to move between thoughts in a way
that generates justified belief, without this movement being
grounded in the thinker’s justified belief about the rule used
in the reasoning. [Boghossian, 2001, 37]
In this passage Boghossian opposes a certain model of inference and
inferential justification. He conceives of reasoning from P to C as a use
of a rule in reasoning. Boghossian assumes that reasoning distinguishes
8In fact there are two quite distinct regress arguments against inferential internal-
ism, see below section 3.2
9This evaluation of the regress-objection has profited from the much more detailed
discussion in Leite [2008].
itself from random moves in thought at least by being rule-guided, being
“a use of a rule in reasoning”. According to the view rejected in this
passage, each justified10 use of a rule in reasoning “is supported by some
knowledge [or justified belief] about the rule”. Boghossian does not ex-
plain what he means by “support” here. But from his development of
the argument, one can gather that the criticized idea is the following:
Only given the further knowledge (or justified belief)11 about the rule
is there a reason or justification for the thinker to move to the conclu-
sion of the inference. In other words, the idea is that the knowledge
about the rule is reason-providing. (Much more on “support” will be
said in section 2) As becomes clear from the second sentence, according
to the criticized view the use of the rule is not only supported (in this
sense) by such further knowledge about the rule. Rather such knowl-
edge intervenes as a “ground of the movement” between P and C and
mediates between these contents —as opposed to allowing for a “simple
move” between P and C. Thus, the criticized view seems to propose the
following model of inference and inferential justification:
Every justified instance of using a rule in reasoning from P
to C is a process in which some knowledge or justified belief
about the rule —knowledge that supports, i.e. is a reason
for, the move from P to C— is applied to the belief in P in
order to move to C.
The problem Boghossian rightly sees with this view is that applying
knowledge about the rule can itself only be understood as an instance
of reasoning, namely reasoning from the believed proposition P and the
known proposition about the rule to the conclusion C.12 The steps of
such a reasoning could be something like the following: P & Moving
from P to C preserves truth & Therefore, C. But in that case, since
the model is to be applied to every instance of reasoning, a further
piece of knowledge has to mediate between the knowledge about the
rule (e.g. knowledge that moving from P to C preserves truth) and its
10If a use of a rule in reasoning yields a justified belief, then the use of the rule is
justified.
11From now only either ‘knowledge about the rule’ and ‘justified belief about the
rule’ will be used. The difference is not relevant for the regress objection.
12Bonjour [2005] tries to avoid this objection by conceiving of the knowledge
about the rule (or the support-relation, see below in the text) as a kind of a non-
propositional, intuitive knowledge. Such a quasi-perceptual knowledge-state does not
combine in the characteristic inferential way with other believed or known proposi-
tions. I discuss this reaction to the regress-objection elsewhere.
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application to P and C. But the application of this further mediating
knowledge is again an instance of reasoning, thus requiring more mediat-
ing and supporting knowledge, and so on. Thus the regress develops.13
But is the criticized view inferential internalism? The (justified) belief
that P supports C required according to inferential internalism may be
understood as a belief “about a rule allowing the move from P to C”.
Let us assume with Boghossian that knowledge about the epistemically
relevant support-relations between propositions is a sort of knowledge
of (epistemic) rules. True, knowledge of a rule is general in a way that
knowledge of a support-relation between particular propositions (as op-
posed to proposition-schemata) need not be. This generality plays some
role in Boghossian’s development of the regress-objection, but the core
of the objection does not depend on it. In order to ease the transition
to talk about the belief that P supports C, we could rephrase “using a
rule in reasoning” as “relying on a (real or alleged) support-relation in
reasoning”. In this manner the criticized view can be formulated in the
same terminology used in characterizing inferential internalism as follows:
support-and-mediation: In order to justifiably rely on a support-
relation in reasoning from P to C the move from P to C must be
supported by a justified belief that P supports C, and the justified
belief that P supports C must be applied to the belief in P in order
to move to C (and thus it must mediate between P and C).
Boghossian’s problem is still (or even better) recognizable in this for-
mulation: the application of the justified belief that P supports C to
the belief in P in order to move to C is an instance of reasoning. Hence
the model must be applied once more. That is, in order to move to C,
a justified belief in the support from P and P supports C to C must be
applied. And so on.
However, inferential internalism does not make any claim about the role
played by the justified belief in P supports C. In particular, it neither
states that the inference is “supported” by the justified belief in P sup-
ports C, nor that the further justified belief in P supports C must be
13I discuss that and other regress-objections in more detail elsewhere; where I also
defend it, at least to some extent, against Leite [2008]. The brief summary given
here focuses on the criticized view’s claim that knowledge about the rule mediates
between belief in P and the belief in C. But the criticized view’s claim that the move
from P to C needs to be supported by knowledge about the rule is also problematic
and quickly leads to a vicious regress.
“applied” to P in order to move to C. Inferential internalism just states
that it is a necessary condition on justified inference that the subject
has such a justified belief in P supports C. At best the argument raises a
challenge for proponents of inferential internalism to specify the way the
further acceptance is supposed to contribute to the fact that the belief
in the conclusion is justified.
Much more is to be said —and will be said shortly— about the idea of
the inference “being supported” by a belief about the support-relation.
And much more is to be said about the move’s being “mediated” by
some such belief. But the present brief presentation suffices to show that
inferential internalism as such is not directly threatened by the prominent
regress argument. Rather inferential internalism must be strengthened
in some way, in order to be prone to the objection.
Because neither the intuition for, nor the most prominent objection
against inferential internalism, directly support or undermine that princi-
ple, it is here proposed to lead that discussion in terms of anti-indifference
rather than inferential internalism. The formulation of anti-indifference
given above is very vague. There are many issues left open: What kind
of attitude is the required ‘acceptance’ —a belief or something else?
Must the attitude have a positive normative status? And if yes, what
are the conditions under which it has such a positive status? How is
the anti-indifference-attitude related to the fact that the inference is jus-
tified? Is it merely a necessary condition? Does it mediate between
premise and conclusion? Does it explain why the inference is justified?
2 An account of believing for a reason
How should the principle of anti-indifference be made more precise? One
way to approach this question is to look for the underlying motivation to
accept anti-indifference. For instance, one could examine in more detail
the connection between responsibility and justification and deduce from
claims about that connection claims about the nature (and involvement)
of the further ‘acceptance’. Another way to approach the question would
be to examine the regress-objections in detail and extract the strongest
version of anti-indifference that avoids these objections. The course cho-
sen here is to turn to the underlying motivation first and address the
regress objections afterwards. The motivation for anti-indifference will
by itself only support a certain version of it —which one can submit
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to the test of the regress-objection. However the grounds for adopting
anti-indifference advanced here do not depend on a certain view on the
interrelation between responsibility and justification. It will be com-
patible with a view that holds that the concept of responsibility is not
properly applicable in the epistemic domain. The motivation will there-
fore neither derive from, nor support an “internalist” perspective on
epistemic justification.
2.1 Reasons condition and basing condition
The model of inferential justification targeted by Boghossian attributes
two distinct roles, “support” and “mediation”, to the further acceptance
required by inferential internalism and anti-indifference. The acceptance
is supposed to ‘support’ the inference and also to ‘mediate’ between
premise and conclusion. Indeed, one may be tempted to appeal to the
further acceptance in response to two distinct questions. The first ques-
tion is “Why is it right for the subject to move to the conclusion?”.
The answer Boghossian imagines inferential internalists to give is “Be-
cause the move is supported by a justified belief or knowledge about the
support-relation between premises and conclusion.” The second question
is “Why does the subject move to the conclusion?”. And the answer is
supposed to contribute to a rationalizing explanation of the move. The
subject might move to the conclusion as a result of some mental illness
or due to some momentary disturbance of the relevant brain-circuits.
But a justified inference is not supposed to be like this: the subject’s
move is an inference, i.e. a move from beliefs in premises to a belief in a
conclusion where the beliefs in the premises contribute to a rationaliz-
ing explanation as opposed to just any sort of causal explanation. Not
any purely causal sort of relation between premise-beliefs and conclu-
sion belief explains in a rationalizing fashion. So what else is needed?
Boghossian thinks that the move must be rule-guided. And he expects
the inferential internalist to explain this in terms of the acceptance’
mediating between premise and conclusion.14
This distinction may easily be overlooked. Especially since usage of the
terms ‘rational’ and ‘justified’ with which ‘support’ and ‘rationalizing
14While Boghossian is not explicit about that distinction in the earlier papers, in
a recent paper [Boghossian, forthcoming] he explicitly discusses only the problem
of mediation —in the guise of a discussion of epistemic rule-following. Boghossian’s
argument is inspired from the famous paper by Carroll [1895] and in some discussions
of that paper the distinction is explicitly made: Stroud [1979], Engel [2005].
explanation’ are to be associated is not uniform.15
It is best to introduce the distinction by way of an example. Consider,
first, the case of Sarah. She has a sufficient reason for believing C —let
us say that C is the proposition The roads are wet now.. Suppose that
her sufficient reason is provided by16 her justified belief in P —where P
is the the conjunction of the propositions It has been raining heavily for
several hours now and If it has been raining heavily for several hours,
then the roads are now wet.. There are other conditions than justifiably
believing P for it to be the case that Sarah has a sufficient reason to
believe C. For instance, she plausibly should not have justified beliefs
that provide a very strong reason for her to disbelieve C. But let us sim-
ply assume that the relevant further conditions, whatever they are, are
fulfilled. In that case Sarah’s justified belief in P supports believing C
(although she does not believe it, perhaps because the question whether
C has not arised).
Sally has the same epistemic reason for believing C as Sarah —thus,
provided by a justified belief in P. But in addition Sally believes C
for that sufficient epistemic reason. This implies that her belief in P
contributes (in some precise manner) to the rationalizing explanation
of her belief in C. In particular the relation between the belief in P and
the belief in C is such that the latter is inferred from the former. Her
belief in C is rational and (doxastically)17 justified.
Samantha also believes P, but her belief in P is unjustified. She therefore
doesn’t have sufficient epistemic reason to believe C. Still her belief in
15Sometimes a belief is said to be ‘rational’ when its explanation is rationalizing.
And sometimes ‘rational’ is applied to beliefs held for a sufficient reason, thus syn-
onymously with ‘justified’. To make things more confusing, ‘justified’ can be used
to evaluate the epistemic position towards a proposition, meaning that the propo-
sition is supported for the subject or, equivalently, that the subject has a sufficient
reason for believing the proposition. At other times ‘justified’ is used to evaluate
the subject’s state of believing a given proposition. To make the first sense explicit
one usually talks of propositional justification. When the second sense is intended
one can talk of doxastic justification. Here ‘rational’ is used to designate the more
restricted notion meaning that the belief has a rationalizing explanation. (See below
in the text for a discussion of how the distinction made here relates to the distinc-
tion between “reason” and “rational requirements” in meta-ethics.) Thus ‘having a
rationalizing explanation’ is not the same as ‘being (doxastically) justified’.
16Saying that the reasons "are provided by" certain mental states is intended to be
neutral with respect to the question of what constitutes the reason: the mental state
of belief, the mental state of knowledge, their content, the facts they represent. This




P contributes (in some precise manner) to the rationalizing explanation
of her belief in C. As in Sally’s case, her belief in C is inferred from her
belief in P. Her belief in C is rational but not justified.
Sue believes Q, the belief in Q is justified. Q is the proposition The
moon shines brightly tonight. Q is not related to C in such a way that
the belief in Q can provide (by itself)18 a sufficient reason for believing
C. However suppose Sue infers C from Q. As Samantha’s, Sue’s belief
in C is rational —for by assumption she has inferred it from Q— but
not justified.
Sally, Samantha and Sue all have a belief in C that is rationalized in
virtue of some relation between the beliefs in P or Q and the belief in C.
These beliefs are thereby rational.19 The connection between the beliefs
is the basing-relation. My inferring C from P, or my (inferentially)20
basing the belief in C on my belief in P implies that my belief in C
is not an idée fixe or a belief I might have due to some mental illness.
That the belief in C is based on the belief in P will here be expressed by
saying that the belief in C is held for a reason (good or bad) provided
by the belief in P.
(A note on terminology: this way of talking implies a distinction between
good and bad, or real and alleged, reasons. But the locution “having
a reason to φ” is often used such as to imply that the reason is good,
while the locution “φ-ing for reason R” is not. The reason for this
difference is that one is very seldom interested in the question whether
a subject merely has a bad reason as opposed to the question whether
she acts/believes for a bad reason. It will almost always be the case
that a given subject is in some mental state or other such that she could
believe for a bad reason provided by that state; one therefore more or
less always has some bad reason to φ. By contrast one luckily does not
18But together with some other belief it could. For instance together with a
justified in belief in the proposition When the moon shines brightly the roads are
flooded and therefore wet.
19Many people would like to use ‘rational’ in such a way that rational beliefs satisfy
consistency-constraints. For instance, they might say, one cannot believe p and ¬p
rationally. But then, one may wonder whether believing p and ¬p is not compatible
with there being a rationalizing explanation for both beliefs. This might suggest
that one needs three notions: ‘justified’, ‘rational’ in the sense of ‘consistent’, and
‘rational’ in the sense of ‘has a rationalizing explanation’. This issue is addressed
later in the text, see 12.
20There may be basing-relations between other kinds of mental states too. For
instance a belief may be based on a perceptual seeming. But when a belief is based
on one or more other beliefs, then it is inferentially based.
always believe for a bad reason, nor unluckily always believe for a good
reason.)
To sum up, given a movement in thought from the belief in P to the belief
in C, the subject believes C for a sufficient epistemic reason provided
by her belief in P if and only if the following two conditions obtain:
basing condition: The belief in P figures (in the right way) in a ra-
tionalizing explanation of the belief in C; or in equivalent formu-
lations: the belief in C is based on the belief in P; the movement
from P to C is an instance of reasoning; the belief in C is held for
a (good or bad) reason provided by the belief in P
reasons condition: The subject has a sufficient reason for believing C
provided by her belief in P. Or equivalently: her justified belief in
P provides inferential support for believing C.
The basing condition ensures that the movement in thought is a rational
process as opposed to pathological or otherwise irrational ones. Nothing
counts as an inference or a piece of reasoning unless this condition is
fulfilled. A minimal ingredient seems to be some causal relation between
the two beliefs —perhaps some sort of causal sustenance relation such
that were the subject to give up belief in P, she would also give up her
belief in C. (But the nature of the relation will be discussed at length
in what follows.)
The reasons condition ensures that if the belief in C is based on P, then
it will be justified. This very plausibly implies that the belief in P is
justified. In addition it plausibly requires that the propositions P and
C are appropriately related, for instance as two propositions such that
the first obviously entails the second.
Let us now suppose, at least for the moment, that the role taken on
by the further acceptance is to partially explain why either the reasons-
condition or the basing-condition obtains. That is, we assume that
the relation between the acceptance and the fact that the belief in the
inferred conclusion is justified is not merely the implication stated by
the principle of inferential internalism. The further acceptance is sup-
posed to be explanatory. The following two explanatory versions of
anti-indifference can then be given:
explanatory reasons-anti-indifference: S’ justified belief in P pro-
vides a sufficient reason for believing C, partially because (ex-
planatory because) S (justifiably) ‘accepts’ that P supports C.
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explanatory basing-anti-indifference S’ move from P to C is an
instance of reasoning, partially because S ‘accepts’ that P supports
C.
Neither principle states the full explanans on the right-hand side. Some
story has to complete the explanation. The suspicion implicit in Boghos-
sian’s argument is that the only way one could fill the gaps of the alleged
explanation would result in a circular explanation. The explanatory
anti-indifference-principles above seem to make sense only if the implic-
itly put forward the two following models:
model of inferential support: S’ justified belief in P provides infer-
ential support for believing C,
because
S’ (justified) ‘acceptance’ that P supports C and her (justified)
belief in P together support C.
model for inferential belief-formation: S’ move from P to C is an
inferential belief-formation,
because
it is a process in which the content of a belief in P supports C
is applied to the content P of another belief in such a way that
together they result in a belief in C.
Neither model mentions exactly the same phenomenon in the explanans
as in the explanandum. The model for inferential support (between
P and C) appeals to the phenomenon of support in general (between
P, P supports C and C) on. However, it is a sensible assumption that
inferential support is one of the basic kinds of support —alongside such
things as perceptual support. There does not seem to be a more basic
kind of support in terms of which inferential support could be explained.
Therefore, and this seems to be the objection Boghossian has in mind,
the model does not allow for a non-circular and non-regressive explana-
tion of the phenomenon of inferential support.21 Take as a test-case one
in which P obviously entails C. Suppose to the question “Why (given I
justifiably believe P) is it right for her to move to C?” the answer “Be-
cause she also justifiably believes/accepts that P entails C.” is given.
This is not a good explanation. For neither is the entailment between
21The regress results when one attempts to explain an instance of the phenomenon
by transforming it into another instance of the phenomenon ad infinitum. The
fundamental mistake of such an explanation is explanatory circularity.
the enhanced set of believed and accepted propositions and the conclu-
sion in any sense “logically stronger” (still “only” entailment), nor is it
more obvious than that between the smaller set consisting of P and the
conclusion C.22
Similarly, suppose we are interested in understanding why someone
moves from P to an obviously entailed C. Something is to explain the
phenomenon of how the subject brings the contents P and C together
in rationally drawing the conclusion C. It is obvious that bringing the
contents P, C and P supports C together in rationally drawing the con-
clusion C is just the same phenomenon again. It is not the case that
bringing these contents together is something more explanatorily funda-
mental than bringing just P and C together. (It does not matter whether
the ‘acceptance’ is another sort of state, for instance something more
intrinsically motivating or intention-like than belief. Nor does it help
to suggest that the involvement of the proposition P supports C is at
a sub-personal level. The phenomenon to be explained remains: con-
tents are brought together in such a way that it results in reasoning.
Furthermore, rationalizing explanation operates at the level of personal,
not sub-personal, states. By appealing to sub-personal states one seems
rather to change the subject than to elucidate cognitive behavior on the
level of rationalizing explanations.)23
2.2 Anti-indifference on the basing condition
Despite the regress argument against explanatory basing-anti-indifference,
it is this, or a very similar, version of anti-indifference that will be de-
fended here. The task, then, is to provide an account of the inferential
basing-relation that does not appeal to the model of inferential belief-
formation above. The further acceptance must mediate between P and
C in a way that does not require that the thinker is engaged in reasoning
involving P, P supports C and C . As a consequence of the proposed
account a certain version of the anti-indifference-principle will be mo-
tivated. It will be granted that this commits to an explanatory claim
about the acceptance. But it will be argued that this does not result in
22In fact it is rather less obvious, since the propositions are slightly more complex
in the enhanced set.
23Well developed versions of this argument and some indications for possible reso-
lutions of the problem can be found in Stroud [1979] and Engel [2005]. As mentioned,
the argument is also developed in Boghossian [forthcoming].
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an explanatory regress.24
There is an initial consideration speaking in favor of motivating anti-
indifference by appeal to conditions on basing rather than by appeal
to conditions for having a reason. Consider the two following (non-
explanatory) anti-indifference-principles:
anti-indifference requirement on the reason-condition: My jus-
tified belief in Q provides a sufficient reason for believing P, only
if I am not indifferent towards the question whether P supports
C.
anti-indifference requirement on the basing-condition: I believe
C for the reason provided by my belief in P, only if I am not in-
different towards the question whether P supports C.
The first principle is prima facie at odds with the view of epistemic rea-
sons as objective. The principle connects the question of whether some-
thing is a good reason for a given person with the question whether the
person takes it to be a good reason. But this is a very controversial con-
nection and to many it seems that epistemic reasons are not in that way
mind-dependent. So, one reason (besides regress-worries) for not taking
there to be a connection is that it comes rather close to an unwanted
relativism. Whether I have a good reason to believe p would depend
on whether I take something to be a good reason, and the whether you
have a good reason depends on whether you take something to be a
good reason. Thus, if we are otherwise epistemically alike, a difference
in epistemic situation arises out of a mere difference in what we accept
as reasons. This is worrying, to say the least. (This argument from anti-
indifference on the reason-condition to relativism is a bit quick here. For
it depends on the issue of whether the anti-indifference-attitude has a
normative status on its own. If a justified attitude towards the propo-
sition that P supports C is required, then it may be that two subjects
cannot disagree on what is a reason for what without the one or the
other being unjustified. And if they cannot disagree without the one
or the other being unjustified, no difference in epistemic situation can
24Leite [2008] motivates inferential internalism by appeal to considerations per-
taining to the reasons-condition too. But for him it is only one among several other
motivations. In particular it is a motivation that he takes to be alongside (or perhaps
connected) to considerations about epistemic responsibility. The course chosen here
is to motivate something like inferential internalism by appeal to an account of the
basing-condition in place of an appeal to considerations pertaining to responsibility.
arise from a difference in attitudes towards support-relations. But (as is
rather obvious) issues concerning a regress — a regress of another sort
than those mentioned— arise for such a view: The justified attitude
towards the support-relation is (plausibly) itself supported by a reason
and therefore dependent on further attitudes towards support-relations
—see below in section 3.2.)
The requirement on the basing-condition, by contrast, does not threaten
objectivity and mind-independence. For there is no temptation in the
first place to say that it should be an objective, mind-independent mat-
ter whether I believe something for a certain (good or bad) reason or for
another or for none. On which reason my belief is based figures in the
rationalizing explanation of my belief-formation. It does not threaten
the objectivity of epistemic reasons, if this depends on what I take to
be reasons for what.
So, the anti-indifference-requirement on basing is less prima facie implau-
sible than the anti-indifference-requirement on the reason condition. But
is it plausible? Consider the following case. Someone, call him Vincent,
has a disposition to form beliefs according to the following pattern:
(A) Yesterday was a sad day.
(B) Today is a sad day.
Consider a given manifestation of that disposition. Now, one of the two
following things will be the case: Either Vincent believes the (B)-type
proposition for the (presumably bad) reason provided by his belief in
the (A)-type proposition, or he manifests a dispositional irrationality. In
other words, he is either irrational due perhaps to his morose character,
or he does (presumably) get the objective reasons wrong but is in our
sense rational, i.e. he does believe for a reason. This is the question
whether a rationalizing explanation applies to Vincent’s belief or not.
This very same question can be asked in the practical case. Given some
behavior, it must be settled —before it can be judged to be justified or
unjustified— whether it is an act done for a reason or not, whether it
is rational or irrational (or arational). Consider the notorious example
of Joe, say, drinking a glass of petrol. Assume that Joe does not like
drinking petrol and has no other good reason to drink petrol. Still the
description of the situation is compatible with two cases. In one case
Joe believes that the liquid in the glass is gin, and it is for the reason
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provided by that belief and his thirst for gin that he drinks it. He still
does not have an objective, good reason to drink the liquid in the glass.
But his behavior is rational, given his mistaken belief that he has got
a glass of gin. He acts for a (motivating, subjective) reason. In the
other case Joe suffers from some irrationality, for instance a form of
compulsion neurosis. Even though he knows that it is petrol and even
though he takes himself to have no reason at all to drink petrol —he
even takes himself to have every reason not to drink it— he cannot help
but drink it. In that case he does not drink it for a reason at all, not
even a bad one. So, there is the same question to be asked about Joe
as the one about Vincent: Does a rationalizing explanation apply to his
behavior, resp. belief-forming behavior?
It is plausible that, if Vincent is indifferent towards the question whether
the fact that yesterday was a sad day makes it likely that today will be
a sad day, then the rationalizing explanation does not apply. Suppose,
for instance, that immediately after Vincent has formed his belief that
today is a sad day, he is convinced by a reliable friend that more often
than not a sad day is followed by a happy day. But suppose that this
has no effect on Vincent’s belief at all. He does not therefore revise his
belief that today is a sad day. Similarly, suppose he is convinced by the
friend before he forms his belief that today is a sad day, but it does not
have any preventing effect on his belief-formation. In such cases we are
not inclined to say that Vincent believes that today is a sad day for the
reason provided by his belief that yesterday was a sad day. In other
words, Vincent’s belief is not inferred from his belief that yesterday is
a sad day. It is merely triggered by that belief.
So, if Vincent is indifferent whether (A) supports (B) or not in the sense
of not being disposed to adjust his attitude towards (B) to information
about that support-relation, it provides a good criterion for determining
whether Vincent believes (B) for the inferential reason provided by (A).
If he is in this sense ‘indifferent’ to the question, then we can safely say
that he doesn’t base his belief in (B) on that reason.
2.3 The ‘accepting*’—attitude
The relevant sense of ‘not being indifferent’ or ‘accepting’ can be spelled
out as follows. The attitude is called “acceptance*”:
acceptance*: A subject accepts* that P supports C in believing C,
iff she is disposed to abandon her belief in C when she obtains
a reason for disbelieving that P supports C (in short: if she is
sensitive to reasons against P supports C).
There is a robust intuition that if Vincent does not bear the acceptance*–
attitude towards (A) supports (B), then he does not base his belief in
(B) on his belief in (A). And provided there is nothing else on which he
bases it, his belief in (B) is in that case a manifestation of irrationality.
It is important to note that acceptance* is an attitude25 towards C,
and not simply an attitude towards P supports C. This can be made
clearer by comparing it to the belief that P supports C. If someone who
believes that P supports C acquires a sufficient reason to disbelieve that
P supports C, then he will normally revise his belief. He will at least
suspend judgment, or —if the reason against is much stronger than the
reason in favor— he will come to disbelieve that P supports C). If his
belief that P supports C is not an idée fixe, his reasons against P supports
C will lead him to revise his belief that P supports C. But this does
not have as a guaranteed consequence that any other belief is revised.
In particular, believing that P supports C and being rational, does not
guarantee that reasons against P supports C have any effect on a belief in
C (if present). The acceptance*–attitude, by contrast, connects reasons
against a proposition with a belief in some other, distinct proposition.
In particular the acceptance* guarantees that reasons against P supports
C have an effect on the belief in C. The two beliefs in P and in C and
the acceptance* are more tightly connected than the three beliefs in C,
in P and in P supports C. Therefore the acceptance* can be described
as an ‘accepting something in believing something else’. In the case at
hand, it is ‘accepted that P supports C in believing C’.
But there is a question whether acceptance* can properly be called a
propositional attitude. We now work under the hypothesis that humans
do accept* certain propositions. The functional role characterizing ac-
ceptance* (of a proposition) is different from the one associated with be-
lief (towards the same proposition). As said, in the case of acceptance*
the role involves guaranteed effects on the attitude towards other propo-
sitions than the one towards which the attitude is held. But in some
respects the acceptance* towards P supports C might be something
more “light-weight” than the belief in P supports C. Neither a believed
nor an accepted* proposition need of course be consciously entertained
in the affirmative mode. There are many propositions I now believe
25For the question whether accepting* is really a propositional attitude see below
in the text.
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without now entertaining them in the affirmative mode. However, these
propositions are more readily entertained in the affirmative mode than
propositions I do not now believe. A believed proposition Q plausibly
is immediately consciously entertained whenever the question whether
Q comes up in conscious deliberation. This happens “immediately” in
the sense that a normal subject does not “think again” about whether
Q —or in other words: the normal subject does not draw upon avail-
able reasons in favor of Q before entertaining Q in the affirmative mode
when she already dispositionally believes Q. No similar claim about ac-
ceptance* follows from the way in which and the theoretical purpose for
which that mental state has been introduced. Perhaps and by contrast
to belief, a proposition that is accepted* is not used so immediately by
normal subjects in conscious deliberation. Perhaps, a normal subject
draws upon reasons in favor of Q before entertaining Q in the affirma-
tive mode, even though she already has accepted* Q in believing some
other proposition. That Q is a proposition she accepts* only implies
that her beliefs are sensitive to reasons against Q —not that she does
not consider reasons in its favor in order to entertain Q in the affirmative
mode.
Such difference in functional role between the hypothesized state of ac-
ceptance* and that of belief perhaps warrants denying acceptances* the
status of propositional attitude. But more important than the question
whether accepted* propositions are used immediately in deliberation is
the question whether it would be right from an epistemological point
of view to use accepted* propositions in this way. In general, the im-
portant question behind the question whether acceptance* is a proposi-
tional attitude is not so much whether the psychological functional role
is sufficiently similar to belief, but rather whether acceptance* has a
normative status on its own. At least this is the most important ques-
tion for epistemological purposes. This question will be addressed in
section 3.2, once it has become clearer what the theoretical purpose of
the state of acceptance* is.
2.4 Acceptance* as reductively explanatory of bas-
ing
So far it has only been said that if Vincent is not in the acceptance*-
state, then we might reasonably say that his belief that today is a sad
day is not inferred from his belief that yesterday was a sad day. Here a
stronger thesis is endorsed: That Vincent accepts* (A) supports (B) in
believing (B) at least partially reductively explains the fact that Vincent
believes (B) for the reason provided by (A). By a “reductive explana-
tion” are meant two things: First, the phenomenon of believing for a
reason or basing can be explained in terms of the notion of acceptance*.
This means that a better understanding of the phenomenon of basing
can be achieved by appeal to the notion of acceptance*. Second, states of
acceptance* partially constitute the facts about basing. That is, there is
an ontological reduction of the basing-relation to states of acceptance*.
For inference from a premise P to a conclusion C in general:
reductive anti-indifference: That the subject bases her belief in C
on her belief in P, is partially reductively explained by the fact
that she accepts* that P supports C in believing C.
Acceptance* of P supports C in believing C only partially reductively
explains the basing-condition. This is because some other propositions
play a similar role. Suppose that ‘P supports C’ means that P renders
C objectively probable. According to what has been said a subject who
believes C for the reason provided by her belief in P must accept that
P renders C objectively probable. But take now another meaning of
‘P supports C’, namely The belief in P provides a sufficient reason for
believing C. Drawing on exactly the same intuitions as in the discussion
of Vincent’s case, it is clear that the subject —at least if she possesses
the higher-order concepts belief and sufficient reason— must accept*
the reflective proposition My belief in P provides a sufficient reason for
believing C too. (This is the reason why in this paper the difference be-
tween the two meanings of ‘P supports C’ does not matter.) Similarly
the subject must not be indifferent towards whether P itself in believ-
ing C: Reasons against P should lead to suspending judgement about
whether C. In general, the class of propositions which the subject has to
accept* in order to base belief in C on belief in P consists of all and only
the negations of the defeaters of S’ reason for believing C provided by
her belief in P. Every sufficient good reason that undermines the reason
providing-role of S’ belief in P is such a defeater. Thus such proposi-
tions as My belief in P is unjustified or I am too tired to draw correct
inferences are also defeaters the negations of which S must accept*.
The idea can be extended to cover the non-inferential case too. Suppose
that perceptually justified beliefs are not held for a reason provided by
a belief —in other words (in line with how ‘inferential’ has been intro-
duced above): suppose perceptual reasons are non-inferential. Suppose
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that the reason is provided by a given perceptual seeming S instead.
According to the account of basing suggested here the fact that one be-
lieves Q for the perceptual reason provided by S is constituted by the
subject’s accepting* certain propositions in believing Q. For example,
I believe for my current perceptual reason that there is a tower over
there because (explanatory “because”) I would suspend judgment were
I to learn that holograms of towers abound in the circumstance. The
general claim about basing put forward here is the following:
general constitutive anti-indifference: What propositions the sub-
ject accepts* in believing something determines for what (good or
bad) reason she holds her belief.
Suppose I believe C and I also believe P which obviously entails C,
in addition I also have a perceptual seeming with content C. Whether
I accept* the proposition P supports C or the proposition I am not
hallucinating content C or both determines whether my belief in C is
based on the belief in P, the perceptual seeming that C, or on both.
Given the propositions the subject accepts* are the negations of the
defeaters of a reason for believing C provided by a belief in P, it is
possible now to say more on the relation between the basing-condition
and what is sometimes called a ‘rational requirement’.26
Rational requirements are commitments that do not coincide with the
commitments one incurs in virtue of the (objective) reasons one has.
For example, suppose I do not have a sufficient reason to believe the
proposition I have a sufficient reason to believe C. Suppose I do (unjus-
tifiably) believe that proposition all the same. Now, given the belief is
not justified, it cannot provide a sufficient reason for believing anything
else. But still, given I do believe I have a sufficient reason to believe
C, I am under some sort of commitment to believe C. Interestingly this
commitment obtains even if I do not have a sufficient reason for believ-
ing C. And my unjustified belief in I have a sufficient reason to believe
C does not provide such a sufficient reason to believe C. So, I have a
commitment to believe C despite lacking a sufficient reason to believe
C! This sort of ‘commitment’ is what is called a ‘rational requirement’.
It is difficult to precisely characterize the logical form of such commit-
ments or to explain their precise normative force (or how exactly they
26The distinction between ‘reason’ and ‘rational requirement’, the relation between
the two and the logical form of the latter is extensively discussed in meta-ethics:
e.g. by Broome [1997, 2000], Kolodny [2005].
relate to objective reasons). But what is interesting in the present con-
text is that commitments that are independent of objective reasons also
follow from the present account of basing. As said, what negations
of defeaters I accept* determines for what reason I believe. But some
defeaters for reasons for believing C are defeaters for any reason for
believing C. Some defeaters are independent of whether your belief is
based on a perception or an inference or anything else. Presumably ¬C
is one such “general” defeater of any justification for believing C. If my
belief in C is held for a reason at all, then I accept* the negation of ¬C
in believing C. That is, I suspend judgment about C when I acquire a
sufficient (hence undefeated) reason for believing ¬C. Similarly if my
belief in C is in our sense rational, then I accept* the negation of I do
not have sufficient reason to believe C. Thus you will be irrational if you
believe C but do not accept* the negations of such general defeaters.
Thus having sufficient reasons for believing these defeating propositions
is incompatible with basing and thus incompatible with a rationalizing
explanation of these beliefs. This automatically disqualifies combina-
tions of obviously inconsistent beliefs. In parallel, there are rational
requirements to avoid inconsistencies. This suggests that ‘rational’ in
our sense as ‘held for a reason’ and ‘rational’ in the sense of ‘does not
violate a rational requirement’ are coextensive —or even the same. This
cannot be argued here, since that would require an extensive discussion
of the (competing) views on rational requirements. Although there is
much more to be said about these issues, it is tempting, once one adopts
the suggested account of basing, to associate ‘rational requirements’ in
this way to the basing-condition.27
27The (unsupported) claim here is that rational requirements such as the rational
requirement to believe C one incurs when one believes I have sufficient reason to be-
lieve C follow from the proposed account of basing. The derivation of that particular
requirement goes as follows:
¬ C is plausibly a defeater for any justification for believing I have sufficient reason
to believe C. I therefore need to accept* its negation, i.e. C, in order to believe I have
sufficient reason to believe C for a reason. Now accepting* C is incompatible with
disbelieving C or with consciously suspending judgment about C (‘incompatible’ here
means that it is impossible to be in the state of accepting* and in one of the other
states too. It follows from the nature of acceptance* as introduced above). Thus
the only options compatible with believing I have sufficient reason to believe C for
a reason are either to believe C or to have no attitude towards C, that is, neither
believing C, nor disbelieving C, nor suspending judgment about C. Thus given I
believe I have sufficient reason to believe C I am under some sort of requirement to
believe C, namely to take as my attitude towards C (if any at all) the belief-attitude.
If I fail to satisfy that requirement I am irrational in the sense that my belief in I
have sufficient reason to believe C is not held for a (good or bad) reason.
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However, as it stands that account of believing for a reason is not very
convincing. There is an immediate threat of a regress (or circularity) of
explanation. Discussion of this threat will lead to an important revision
of the account in the next section.
3 Regresses again
3.1 An explanatory regress
The most immediate threat to the proposed account of the basing-
condition is posed by an explanatory regress argument. For the following
objection must be raised:
Suppose, in line with the proposed account, that Vincent
accepts* (A) supports (B) in believing (B). That is, Vincent
is disposed to suspend judgment with respect to (B) if he has
a reason against (A) supports (B). But Vincent could be so
disposed towards such reasons in the wrong way. Suppose
mental state M provides a sufficient reason R against (A)
supports (B). Now, M could explain why Vincent suspends
belief in (B) as a mere triggering cause —that is without ra-
tionalizing his suspending belief in (B). Vincent could have
complex irrational dispositions that mimic the behavior of
someone who is rational. Suppose for instance that Vincent
has the irrational disposition to suspend belief in a proposi-
tion p whenever he acquires a reason against a proposition of
the form [x supports p], where ‘x’ stands for any proposition
whatsoever.
But in that case Vincent does not believe (B) for the
reason provided by his belief in (A).
This objection shows that basing cannot be reductively explained by
a dispositional connection between the mental state M that provides
a reason R for disbelieving that (A) supports (B) and Vincent’s sus-
pending belief in (B). Acceptance* cannot account for basing, for the
It is clear that the question whether the so deduced requirement corresponds to
the requirement people have in mind when discussing rational requirements depends
on difficult and controversial questions about the normative force and the form of
the rational requirement at issue in the example.
mere disposition to suspend judgment triggered by some mental state
M that happens to provide defeating reasons R is not sufficient. The
mental state M must rationalize suspending judgment. In other words,
the subject must suspend judgment for reason R.
Let us introduce ‘acceptance**’ as the disposition to suspend belief for
reason R, as opposed to ‘acceptance*’ which is merely the disposition
to suspend judgment as a (non-rationalizing) reaction to reason R:
acceptance**: A subject accepts** that P supports C in believing C,
iff she is disposed to suspend belief in C for any sufficient reason
R for disbelieving that P supports C.
Acceptance** has a main drawback —at least apparently— that accep-
tance* lacks. The problem is that acceptance** (as before acceptance*)
is supposed to account for what it is to believe something for a reason.
But if acceptance** is characterized in terms of suspending judgment
for a reason, we remain in the same category of phenomena. It does
not seem to be very informative to be told that basing a belief on some-
thing is constituted by a disposition to base a suspension of judgment
on certain things. It seems that Boghossian’s challenge, namely to pro-
vide an explanation of the phenomenon of inference (of the inferential
basing-relation) that is not implicitly circular has not been met. By
contrast, acceptance*, if it had been sufficient, could have given us a
non-circular and non-regressive explanation. For it does not need to be
characterized in terms of the phenomenon to be explained.
What is needed is an independent characterization of acceptance**. The
idea pursued here is to account for acceptance** in terms of a regress
of mere dispositions to react to certain reasons, i.o.w. in terms of ac-
ceptances*. What accounts for believing for a certain reason? A dis-
position to suspend judgment for certain reasons. What accounts for
the disposition to suspend judgment for certain reasons? A disposition
—accompanying the disposition to suspend judgment— to suspend sus-
pending judgment for certain reasons (scope: to suspend {suspending
judgment} for certain reasons). What accounts for suspending suspend-
ing judgment for certain reasons? Obviously we can appeal to ever more
dispositions to suspend suspending suspending . . . judgment for certain
reasons. In this way we get an “explanation” in infinitely many steps of
the phenomenon of believing for a certain reason. The final element of
the “explanation” is the infinitely complex disposition to suspend sus-
pending . . . (ad infinitum) judgment for certain reasons. The regress is
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an “account” of sorts of the initial believing for a certain reason. It is
an “account” in the sense that the initial phenomenon of believing for
a certain reason is explained in terms of another phenomenon, namely
the infinitely complex disposition to suspend suspending . . . judgment
for certain reasons. But it is obviously not an account of the general
phenomenon of doing something (believing, suspending judgment) for
a reason. Suppose now that we replace the final element of the “ex-
planation” by the mere disposition to suspend suspending . . . judgment
triggered by certain reason-providing states. In this way we eliminate
the phenomenon of doing (believing, suspending) something for a reason
from the explanation and we do obtain an explanation of the general
phenomenon in terms of a phenomenon of which we have a better an-
tecedent grasp: a causal disposition to react to certain mental states.
Let us introduce a regress of reasons R, R1, R2, . . . of the following form:
- R is a reason for S to disbelieve that P supports C
- R1 is a reason for S to disbelieve that R supports ¬ (P supports C)
- R2 is a reason for S to disbelieve that R1 supports ¬ (R supports ¬
(P supports C)) . . .
Now, acceptance** that P supports C in believing C can be character-
ized as the state(s) rendering the following infinite set of counterfactuals
true:28
- If S were to obtain R but not R1, she would suspend judgment about
C
- If S were to obtain R and R1 but not R2, she would not suspend
judgment about C (and thus continue to believe C)
- If S were to obtain R and R1 and R2 but not R3, she would suspend
judgment about C.
- If S were to obtain R and R1 and R2 and R3 but not R4, she would
not suspend judgment about C (and thus continue to believe C).
- . . .
28Thanks to Philipp Keller and Stephan Leuenberger for helping me to clarify the
main idea in this way.
None of the counterfactuals involves an acceptance** or a suspension of
judgments for a reason.
With that account of acceptance**, the following account of the basing-
condition is no longer circular:
basing: S bases her belief in C on the reason provided by her belief in
P, partially because S accepts** in believing C that P supports C.
Since this account is explicitly regressive, the most urgent question is
whether the regress is vicious or not. Let us say that a regress of condi-
tions is unsatisfiable if humans cannot fulfill the infinity of conditions.
If the regress is unsatisfiable, then it is vicious. First, we can note that
the regress of counterfactuals above does not require a temporally or-
dered infinity of brain-states. Thus human mortality is not a problem
(here!). Second, the increasing complexity of the counterfactuals is due
only to the antecedent. The consequent is always either to believe C or
to suspend judgment about C. It is not impossible or even unlikely that
a materially finite machine such as the brain renders such an infinite se-
quence of counterfactuals true. Third, a point could be made that most
of the counterfactuals in the sequence are trivially true. That is, most of
the counterfactuals could be true not in virtue of one or several specific
brain-state(s), but instead in virtue of human limitations. Consider the
series of reasons R, R1, R2, . . . The propositions for which each of them
is a reason become ever more complex. But it is not humanly possible
to grasp infinitely complex propositions. It is therefore arguably not
possible for subjects to acquire reasons for believing such propositions.
Therefore, it is not humanly possible for most of the antecedents to
obtain. But since human possibility constrains the domain of possible
worlds on which these counterfactuals are to be evaluated, most of them
have a necessarily false antecedent. And such counterfactuals, at least
according to Lewis’ semantics for counterfactuals, are true. If this ar-
gument is correct then the counterfactuals the truth of which depends
on specific brain-states are of a finite number. Thus human limitations
are not really in the way of the existence of truth-makers for the infi-
nite sequence of counterfactuals, on the contrary they rather partially
constitute them.29
But a regress can be vicious even if it is satisfiable. In particular a regress
may be a sign of implicit explanatory circularity, as has been pointed
29If I did not misunderstand him, something like this idea was put forward by Josh
Schechter during a presentation of an earlier version of this paper.
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out earlier. But the regressive account of acceptance** was introduced
precisely in order to break out of a circle of explanations. The important
point to note here is that the idea is not to explain basing in terms of
dispositions to base, itself again explained in terms of a dispositions to
base, and so on. The idea is rather to explain basing in terms of an
infinity of dispositions (or better: in terms of truth-makers for infinitely
many counterfactuals), themselves not characterized in terms of basing.
The account provides a reductive explanation of basing.
It must be admitted that opinions about whether the explanation is a
good explanation will diverge. For some people it will be more or less
trivial that the explanation does not succeed. They will point out that
however complex the disposition of the subject, it will never be possible
to explain rationalization in terms of it. They will perhaps appeal to an
intuition to the effect that even a subject who is such that the regress
of counterfactuals is true about her could be irrational, i.e. could be so
disposed in the wrong way. (This intuition is briefly discussed in sec-
tion 3.2 in relation to a responsibilist version of the view proposed here.)
These people will want to take the notion of rationally responding to a
reason as undefined and irreducible. Perhaps they are right. But it still
seems to be the case that pointing towards the complex dispositions to
respond to defeaters explains to some extent what sort of phenomenon
rationalizing is. Even if it does perhaps not explain the phenomenon by
giving all the constitutive facts, it may explain it by giving the conse-
quences the undefinable relation should have. But it is not clear that
so much needs to be conceded to these critics. For note that if the
regress is infinite, then there will be no connection between one of the
reasons R in the series and the corresponding suspension of judgment
or suspension of suspension such that it is easy to argue that it could
be of the wrong kind. That is, it is not possible to raise the objection
raised against the account in terms of acceptance* at the beginning of
this section, namely that the dispositional connection could be of the
wrong kind, about any one connection between some Rx in the series
and corresponding suspension in the series. For on the proposed account
any such connection is embedded in the subject’s psychology in such a
way that the infinite series of counterfactuals are true. So intuitions
about particular relations between mental states do not speak against
the proposal. The objection needs to invoke some general argument and
thesis about rationalization. And it is not clear what provides such an
argument.
Thus it should be clear that the proposed account avoids Boghossian’s
worry as explained above: The proposed account of the basing-condition
and incidentally the account of what it is to infer C from P does not
rely on an antecedently understood explanation of what it is to infer C
from P and P supports C. There is no appeal to the acceptance** of
P supports C as something on which C is based (or as something from
which C is inferred) in the ultimate account.
A much more general objection against the account might come to mind.
Is this not an attempt at naturalizing normativity? And do we not
know that such attempts are bound to fail? But the answer to the
first question is: No. Rationality in the sense captured by the basing-
condition does not exhaust the normative. Indeed, it is not clear that it
is a normative condition at all. What is a clearly normative condition is
the reasons-condition. The fact that I have certain (objective) reasons
renders it true that I ought to do certain things (or that I am permitted
and forbidden certain things). But the fact that I take something to be a
reason in the sense of the basing-condition might just be a psychological
fact about me. It is true that, if the account of basing given here is
roughly correct, it is not possible to account for basing without recourse
to the normative notion of an (objective) reason. For basing is explained
in terms of a certain sort of complex responsiveness to certain objective
reasons (e.g. reason R for disbelieving that P supports C). But this does
not mean that facts about basing give rise to ‘oughts’ and ’shoulds’.
Of course, some conditions must be fulfilled in order for facts about
basing to obtain. And it has been suggested that the fulfillment of
these conditions guarantees the fulfillment of a basic level of rationality
—the one associated with rational requirements.30
3.2 A regress on the normative status of acceptances**
From the proposed account of believing for a reason follows an anti-
indifference-principle: A move from P to C, or a dependence of the
30This is a major difference between the account of basing given here and the
one defended by Leite [2004]. He takes the basing-relation to give raise to certain
commitments. On the account proposed here satisfaction of the basing-condition
ensures that the basic level of evaluation as ‘rational’ is fulfilled. It is not possible
to be irrational in not behaving according to the commitments taken on by basing
one’s belief on a certain (good or bad) reason. See the discussion of the relation
between the basing-condition and rational requirements on page 12.
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belief in C on the belief in P, is an inference, or inferential basing-
relation, only if the subject accepts** in believing C that P supports
C. This way of speaking suggests that it is a propositional attitude and
that consequently it is subject to normative constraints. But it is not
clear yet whether the acceptance** has a normative status on its own.
From the psychological point of view it is a mere disposition. Does it
need to be backed up by reasons in favor of P supports C? Or is it more
like an assuming that P supports C on the basis of nothing, but which
is O.K. under certain conditions? Or is it something outside the “realm
of reasons”, so to speak; something which does not have a normative
status, not even that of rightly assuming on no reason? That is, it is
not clear yet whether the anti-indifference-principle that follows from
the account of inferring looks more like the first or the second of the
following:
moderate anti-indifference: S justifiably infers C from P, only if she
accepts** that P supports C in believing C.
immoderate anti-indifference: S justifiably infers C from P, only if
she justifiably (rightly, virtuously, etc.) accepts** that P supports
C in believing C.
The question whether moderate or immoderate anti-indifference is cor-
rect will be the most important question for proponents and opponents
of inferential internalism. In particular, so far opponents of inferential
internalism need not worry too much about the proposed account of
basing. If acceptances** do not have a normative status on their own,
then they do not have the epistemological implications associated with
propositional attitudes. In particular, these are then not states sup-
ported by reasons.
Opponents to inferential internalism do not only worry that the belief
in P supports C plays an inferential role in rendering the belief in C
justified. This was the worry discussed in the preceding section. The
proposed account of basing answers that worry by appealing to the psy-
chologically special state of acceptance** instead of the state of belief.
But opponents of inferential internalism are also uncomfortable about
the way in which the belief in P supports C is itself justified.31 If it
is always inferentially justified, then a regress of reasons immediately
31See among many others Fumerton [1995], Boghossian [2003]. The worry about
the justification of beliefs about how the truth of the premises render the conclusion
likely to be true is of course the essential ingredient in Hume’s sceptical problem
arises. But the other option, namely that it is non-inferentially justi-
fied, presumably by some a priori insight, also gives raise to considerable
discomfort —especially if one understands “supports” as “probabilizes”.
That C is objectively likely given P just does not seem to be some-
thing one could always know a priori. No one so far has been able to
convincingly argue that it is knowable a priori that inductive premises
probabilize the inductive conclusion. Thus an infinite regress of reasons
or a circle of reasons threatens, for such propositions can themselves
only be inductively supported needing further inferential support.
This classic worry arises in the context of the current proposal about
basing too. If the acceptances** must be based on adequate reasons
(whether the basing involved is inferential or not does not make much
difference), then the following infinite regress obtains: For the accep-
tance** to be in good standing it cannot be sufficient that there is a
supporting reason. The acceptance** must be based on that reason.
This introduces infinitely many further acceptances**. This is regress
is independent of the fact whether the supporting reason is inductive
or not. Even if the acceptance** is based on an a priori insight, the
basing-relation itself requires further acceptances**. And each further
acceptance** needs the support by further reason-providing state and
further acceptances** that constitute the basing-relation between ac-
ceptance** and reason-providing state. This prospect is prima facie
worrying —more worrying than the truth of the infinity of counter-
factuals implied by the acceptance**-states constituting one particular
basing-relation.
There is at least the following choice of answers to the question of what
renders the anti-indifference attitude justified. The first, the deflation-
ary answer, is given by a proponent of moderate anti-indifference:
The deflationary answer: Acceptances** do not have a normative
status.
The regressive answer: Acceptances** are held for a reason.
The externalist answer: Acceptances** must have the right causal
history: they are mere causal responses (vs. rational reactions) to
the presence of reasons for the relevant propositions.
about inductive justification. For the principle of the Uniformity of Nature is nothing
else than the claim that the truth of the generalization of an enumerative induction
is objectively likely given the truth of the premises.
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If one gives the regressive answer one will have to argue that the regress
of acceptances** and reasons mentioned in the preceding paragraph is
not vicious. If one gives the externalist answer one avoids the regress by
denying that the acceptance** is based on the states providing the reason
in favor of the accepted** proposition. While nothing speaks against the
latter answer, it is not clear why one should favor it over the deflationary
answer. For as externalist as it is, that kind of support cannot render the
acceptance** more responsible. Thus, classic internalist considerations
about responsibility do not speak in favor of the externalist answer.
Much speaks in favor of the deflationary answer, if anti-indifference is
exclusively motivated by concerns about the basing-relation. For the
traditional understanding of the division of labor between the basing-
condition and the reasons-condition is that the basing-condition is a
purely psychological matter while everything of normative relevance is
in the reasons-condition. This is reflected in everyday “reasons” talk.
The subject already “has a reason for believing C”, namely the reason
provided by P. He does not need an additional “reason to believe for
that reason”.
For illustration here is a possible situation in everyday justificatory prac-
tice: Suppose I am asked “What is your reason for believing C?” and the
response is “P”. Does it make sense to ask “Now that you have given
me the reason for which you believe C, and I agree that it is a good
reason and that you do believe for that reason, please tell me what is
your reason for believing for that reason, so that we can settle whether
you are really justified in believing C” ? This seems odd. It is natural
to say that one is justified in believing C, when the reason for which
one believes is good.
It might be that there is some extra motivation, one outside concerns
about the basing-relation, for requiring that the acceptances** are sup-
ported by further reasons. For instance, a concern about epistemic
responsibility might be invoked. Is not a subject who accepts** the
relevant propositions about support in believing C on no reason at all
behaving irresponsibly? And does not a subject who by some accident
happens to have whatever renders the infinitely many counterfactuals
true lack epistemic responsibility or epistemic virtue?32
It is not possible to discuss this extra motivation in detail here, for
epistemic responsibility is a very difficult and large topic on its own. But
32This question was put to me by Martine Nida-Rümelin about a similar account
of basing I defended in my PhD Thesis.
the general thrust of this paper has been to motivate anti-indifference and
to explain the intuition in its favor by concerns about basing in place of
concerns about epistemic responsibility. And in line with this it makes
most sense to resist these concerns again. Furthermore there is a way in
which the concerns about someone who just happens by lucky accident
to have the sensitivity to all the relevant defeaters can be addressed
without stepping outside the scope given by the deflationary answer.
It has been argued that in order to infer C from P, the subject must
accept** P supports C in believing C. But it has been said that she
must accept** other propositions too. In particular, a subject who is
sufficiently conceptually sophisticated should accept** reflective propo-
sitions such as the belief in P provides a good reason for believing C. And
it is very plausible that one should also accept** very general reflective
propositions such as I am in general capable of believing for adequate rea-
sons. Now, in line with the deflationary answer, acceptance** of these
reflective propositions need not be backed up by reasons in favor of them.
Still the mere fact that the subject is sensitive to reasons against them
guarantees in some sense that the whole class of acceptances** required
for basing is sufficiently integrated within the subject’s belief-system.
It guarantees a level of reflectivity sufficient to deflect worries about a
pure-luck disposition and accompanying lack of epistemic virtue or re-
sponsibility. Thus, if I just happen by sheer luck to have on an occasion
the right sensitivity towards all the right propositions at all levels reflec-
tive —and non-reflective—, then my being sensitive to all the relevant
defeating reasons at all levels just seems sufficient. For it is not a matter
of luck that I maintain my belief in C. I maintain it because there are
no defeating reasons against my adequate reason provided by the belief
in P. The acceptances** guarantee that otherwise I would not. Thus
the often invoked requirement of reflectivity and cognitive integration
on epistemic virtue is in fact satisfied by the proposed account of basing.
This paper proposes an account of inferring C from P and more generally
of believing for a reason. It captures the intuitive idea that this requires
taking P (or the state with content P) to provide a reason for believing
C. This has then been interpreted in terms of a special mental state,
namely the state of acceptance**, thereby avoiding the traditional worry
that any further attitude (besides the beliefs in P and in C) involved
in the inference will lead to a psychological and explanatory regress. It
had to be conceded that acceptance** is a mental state that renders and
infinity of counterfactuals true. But it has been argued that it is on the
one hand psychologically possible for humans to be in such a state and
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that the ensuing explanation of believing for a reason or inferring is not
circular. While a non-vicious regress has thus been countenanced it has
been denied that a justificatory regress ensues. For acceptances** are
not the sort of mental states that are supported by further reasons and
based on further reason-providing states. This account of believing for
a reason allows to capture the intuitive appeal of traditional internalist
principles about inferential justification such as inferential internalism,
while it at the same time avoids relying on the controversial notion of
epistemic responsibility.
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